Excerpt from The Rise and Fall of Muslim Civil Society (Dr. Omar Imady): Introduction

Introduction 

Various scholarly explanations have been set forth regarding why Islamic reform, a movement preoccupied with reviving Islamic civilization and resisting Western colonialism through the creation of a Muslim civil society, was superseded, in the mid-twentieth century, by Islamic fundamentalism, a movement preoccupied with creating an ‘Islamic state’ by violence if necessary Such explanations can be classified into two major categories: ‘traditional legacy’, and ‘external dynamics’. 

The ‘traditional legacy’ category includes works that explain Islamic fundamentalism as a product of the traditional legacy of Islam, which makes no separation between religion and state and which promotes political violence through the emphasis it places on jihad or morally ordained struggle/resistance.Muslim religious scholars, however, strongly discouraged violent political descent. Regarding the confrontation of government authority, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) wrote: “What is well known regarding the position of Sunni religious scholars is that they do not sanction rebellions against rulers”, and “Sixty years under an oppressive ruler is better than one night of anarchy.”

It is also true that political violence frequents Islamic history. Moral legitimacy for such violence, however, was provided by religious scholars belonging to heretical Muslim sects known for their militant character (e.g. al-Hashashin, or the Assassins, etc.). Not only did Sunni religious scholars highly discourage violence against the government, but they also articulated a sophisticated and complex approach to the use of violence, within the framework of jihad, that barred targeting children, women, religious figures (regardless of the religion they belonged to) and all those who are not directly engaged in the war effort against Muslims. Thus, to portray the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism as an expression of Islam’s traditional legacy is to ignore centuries in which the use of political violence was categorically rejected by Sunni religious scholars. 

Recognizing the lack of a strong precedent within the Sunni traditional legacy for political violence, studies in the category of ‘external dynamics’ have presented Islamic fundamentalism as a reaction against “the growth of the nation state and the peculiar problems of the twentieth century.”6 Factors such as the failure of secular and/or national regimes to bring about economic prosperity, Israel’s major victories in 1948 and 1967, and Iran’s ‘Islamic revolution’ are usually emphasized by such studies. Clearly severe economic conditions and military defeats do tend to create an environment conducive to the rise of politicized and often violent movements. There are numerous historical examples, however, of such conducive climates that did not give birth to similar movements (e.g. post WWII Germany and Japan). Further, while it is clear that Iran’s revolution fueled the enthusiasm for Islamic fundamentalism, it is equally clear that fundamentalist institutions existed long before Iran’s revolution was even contemplated by its leaders. 

A more accurate explanation of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism can be arrived at by focusing on its institutional background, that is, the process through which Western institutions were adopted by Muslim reformers during the late nineteenth/early twentieth century. The adoption of the journal, the association, the political party, and the paramilitary force by Muslim reformers, as documented by subsequent chapters, reflected a frame of mind that regarded institutions as non ideological objects which could be utilized by various types of movements, irrespective of their principles and the setting within which they were operating. It was only when the adopted institutions began to take on a life of their own that Muslim reformers realized that certain institutions, (the political party and the paramilitary force in particular) could not be appropriated to their agenda. While the political party shifted the focus of the reform movement from the community to the state, the paramilitary force shifted its focus from colonial resistance to political violence. By then, however, it was too late. What had been adopted from the West could no longer be returned. 

Ironically, Islam had a similar institutional impact on the West during the Middle Ages. In The Rise of Colleges, George Makdisi argues that the scholarly system of the West has its roots in Islamic soil.Europe’s adoption of the Muslim ijazat al-tadris (the license to teach) during the Middle Ages irreversibly undermined its hierarchal system of learning which was previously monopolized by the Church. A horizontal scholarly system emerged which endowed the European scholar not only with the license to teach, but also with ijazat al-ifta’, or the license to profess an authoritative opinion, an act which was previously the exclusive right of ‘the college of bishops in union with the pope’. Likewise, the use of the political party and the paramilitary force by Muslim reformers irreversibly altered the way in which they understood their relationship to the government and to the reform movement. In both cases, techniques belonging to other cultures were treated as neutral and in both cases they undermined traditional perceptions and attitudes, and proved potentially explosive.

This study aims at documenting the link between the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and a process of institutional change which was carried out by four Muslim reformers: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), Rashid Rida (d. 1935), and Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949). The process, which involved the relinquishing of the institutions of traditional Muslim community, i.e. madrasah (religious college), tariqah (religious order), and ta’ifah (artisan/merchant guild), aimed at creating a Muslim civil society that could both revive Islamic civilization and resist Western colonialism. The dichotomy between Western institutional form and the moral vision of Islamic reform, together with a consistently hostile government, are shown to have been the principal factors behind the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. 

The historical context for this study is found in ‘Part I’ where (a) an overview of the forerunner for Muslim civil society, i.e. the traditional Muslim community, is presented; and (b) the introduction of the institutions of civil society by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani to the religious scholars of Egypt is documented. ‘Part II’ covers the major institutions of Muslim civil society, i.e. the utilization of the journal by Muslim reformers, the utilization of the association, the utilization of the political party, and, finally, the utilization of the paramilitary force. ‘Part III’ covers the fall of Muslim civil society by analyzing the primary factors underlying the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.

Notes have been removed; they are available in the original.